Simplicial complexes are a versatile and convenient paradigm on which to build all the tools and techniques of the logic of knowledge, on the assumption that initial epistemic models can be described in a distributed fashion. Thus, we can define: knowledge, belief, bisimulation, the group notions of mutual, distributed and common knowledge, and also dynamics in the shape of simplicial action models. We give a survey on how to interpret all such notions on simplicial complexes, building upon the foundations laid in [26] .
Introduction
Epistemic logic investigates knowledge and belief, and change of knowledge and belief, in multi-agent systems. Since [36] it has developed into multiple directions. Knowledge change was extensively modelled in temporal epistemic logics [3, 27, 51] and more recently in dynamic epistemic logics [64] , where action model logic was particularly successful [6] . Modelling asynchrony and concurrency in epistemic logic has been investigated in many works in a temporal or dynamic setting [17, 27, 29, 37, 48, 50, 51] and more recently in dynamic epistemic logic [5, 16, 38] .
Combinatorial topology has been used to great effect in distributed computing to model concurrency and asynchrony since the early works [8, 21, 43] that identified one-dimensional connectivity invariants, and the higher dimensional topological properties discovered in the early 1990's e.g. [33, 34] . A recent overview is [32] . The basic structure in combinatorial topology is the simplicial complex, a collection of subsets of a set of vertices closed under containment. The subsets, called simplices, can be vertices, edges, triangles, tetrahedrons, etc.
Geometric manipulations that preserve some of the topology of an initial simplicial complex, such as subdivision, correspond in a natural and transparent way to the evolution of a distributed computation by a set of agents. In turn, the topological invariants preserved, determine the computational power of the distributed computing system (defined by the possible failures, asynchrony, and communication media).
Recently, an epistemic logic interpreted on simplicial complexes has been proposed [25, 26, 41] . There is a categorical correspondence between the usual Kripke model frames to interpret epistemic logic and models based on simplicial complexes. The epistemic logic of [26] is also a dynamic epistemic logic: the action models of [6] correspond to simplicial complexes in the same way as Kripke models, but then with a dynamic interpretation, such that action execution is a product operation on simplicial complexes. In this way, [26] models distributed computing tasks and algorithms in their combinatorial topological incarnations as simplicial complexes. As their knowledge operators can be interpreted for typical asynchronous algorithms (e.g. when processes communicate by writing and reading shared variables), this is a relevant notion of asynchronous knowledge, as it reasons over indistinguishable asynchronous sequences of events, although differently so than [16] . Predating [26] the work of Porter [52] already established a relation between multi-agent epistemic models and simplicial complexes by way of the logic of knowledge. In that work the dynamics were based on the runs-and-systems approach of [27, 20] and not on a dynamic epistemic logic as in [26] .
In this work we further explore and survey what the logic of knowledge can contribute to the description of simplicial complexes and their dynamic evolution. The goal is to present an introduction to a variety of issues that arise when using simplicial complexes in epistemic logic; each one can be studied in more detail, and many problems remain open.
Organization This is an overview of our contribution. Section 2 introduces informally, and motivates the simplicial complex approach to epistemic logic. Section 3 presents the logical and topological tools and techniques that we build upon in this work and also reviews the results of [26] . Section 4 defines bisimulation for simplicial complexes, and gives the obvious adequacy results for the notion. Section 5 presents a local semantics for the logic of knowledge on simplicial complexes. In [26] the designated object for interpreting formulas always is a facet of the simplicial model under consideration. By local semantics we mean that the designated object can be any simplex. Local semantics therefore allow us to check the truth even in a vertex of a complex, that represents that local state of an agent. Section 6 investigates when epistemic models (Kripke models wherein all accessibility relations are equivalence relations) can be transformed into local epistemic models with the same information content. An epistemic model is local if for each variable there is an agent such that the value of that variable is uniform in any of her equivalence classes. Section 7 presents semantics on simplicial complexes for the well-known group epistemic notions of mutual, common, and distributed knowledge. In that section we also explore novel group epistemic notions describing higher-dimensional features of complexes, such as truth on a manifold. Section 8 defines belief for simplicial complexes. Unlike knowledge of propositions, belief of propositions does not entail that these propositions are true. Beliefs may be false. This is useful to model distributed systems wherein agents may be mistaken about what other agents know or believe, or even about their own local state. Section 9 defines simplicial action models. Unlike [26] , we define preconditions on vertices (from which preconditions for facets can be derived, and vice versa) and we also model factual change (change of the value of variables). As an example of factual change we then model binary consensus in distributed computing. A short concluding section describes further avenues for exploration.
An informal introduction to epistemic logic on simplicial complexes
Epistemic logic, also known as the logic of knowledge, has been interpreted on a wide variety of model classes, including Kripke models where all relations are equivalence relations (a.k.a. epistemic models) [20] , rough sets [7] , neighbourhood structures [14, 47] , subset space models [15] , (not necessarily discrete) topological spaces [49, 46] , and the central topic of this paper, simplicial complexes [26, 41] . Simplicial complexes provide a fascinating new point of view on epistemic logic. In this section, we give an intuitive explanation of the notion of simplicial model, its relation with the more traditional epistemic models, and the new questions that arise from this new simplicial point of view. Precise definitions of all the concepts discussed here will be given in Section 3.1.
The main object of study in epistemic logic is the modal operator K a ϕ, which stands for the statement "the agent a knows that the formula ϕ is true". The usual Kripke semantics for this operator is based on an epistemic model, which consists of a set S of global states, and for each agent, an equivalence relation on S called the indistinguishability relation. By definition, the formula K a ϕ is true in some global state s whenever ϕ is true in every state t which is indistinguishable from s by the agent a.
In the simplicial complex point of view, each global state is represented by a basic geometric shape called a simplex. The dimension of these simplices depends on the total number of agents that we consider: they are edges for 2 agents, triangles for 3 agents, tetrahedrons for 4 agents, and more generally, n-simplices for n + 1 agents. The notion of indistinguishability between global states is encoded geometrically by gluing these basic blocks together. Thus, simplicial models are of a geometric nature. Indeed, in the field of combinatorial topology, simplicial complexes are the primary representation of a topological space, see for example [18, 39] .
Epistemic models based on local states Global states are the main elements of epistemic models, which have served as the basis of the most widely used semantics for all varieties of modal logic, since the 1960s. However, in many situations, the focus is on local states. This is for example the case in distributed computing, where the central role of topology for multi-agent computation was discovered. Here, the agents are parallel processes that communicate with each other via message-passing or shared memory. The local state of an agent is defined by its local memory, program counter, etc. Indeed, we take most of our examples and motivations from this area.
Another motivation for focusing on local states is the relativistic perspective, where at any given moment an agent's local state exists and is well-defined but not necessarily so the (global) state. In fact, there may be more than one state which is compatible with a set of local states of the agents. Indeed, even talking about absolute real time is impossible according to relativity theory, so it may not make sense to talk about the state at some real time t. This relativistic approach has been considered since early on in computer science [40] .
Simplicial models We thus move away from defining an epistemic model in terms of global states, to one defined in terms of local states. Then, a global state s for n + 1 agents can be decomposed as a tuple ( 0 , . . . , n ), consisting of one local state for each agent. In a simplicial model, each of these local states is modeled separately as a vertex of a simplicial complex. With this point of view, a global state corresponds to a set of n + 1 vertices, that is, an n-dimensional simplex. Two global states are indistinguishable by some agent when it has the same local state in both of them. In a simplicial model, this fact is represented by a situation where one vertex (the local state of the agent) belongs to two different simplices (the two global states).
To give an intuitive understanding of how simplicial complexes are used to model epistemic situations, we present a few examples adapted from [26, 32, 41] . In all examples, we work with either two or three agents in order to be able to draw low-dimensional pictures. The agents are often represented as colours, gray, white, and black. The local state of an agent is written inside or besides a vertex of the corresponding colour. Global states are represented as edges (for 2 agents) or triangles (for 3 agents).
Example 1 For readers familiar with the muddy children puzzle, the picture below represents the initial knowledge for three children {gray, white, black}, viewed as a simplicial model. The local view of a child is written as a vector of three symbols among {0, 1, ⊥}, where each symbol corresponds to gray, white, and black, in that order. The '0' symbol means no mud, '1' means muddy, and '⊥' means that the child cannot see her own forehead.
For instance, the black vertex labeled by 00⊥ corresponds to the local state of the third child ("black"), which is able to see that the other two children are not muddy. Since she cannot see her own forehead, this vertex belongs to two possible global states: one where all children are clean, and one where only the third child is muddy. On the picture, global states are represented by triangles, and indeed the black vertex labeled by 00⊥ belongs to two of those triangles.
Example 2 Each agent gets as input a binary value 0 or 1, but does not know which value has been received by the other agents. So, every possible combination of 0's and 1's is a possible state. In contrast with the previous example, here each agent knows only its own value and not the other agents' values. The figures below depict this situation for 2 and 3 agents, as epistemic models and as simplicial models.
In the epistemic models, the agents are called g, w, b, and the global state is represented as a vector of values, e.g., 101, representing the values chosen by the agents g, w, b (in that order). In the 3-agents case, the labels of the dotted edges have been omitted to avoid overloading the picture, as well as other edges that can be deduced by transitivity.
In the simplicial model, agents are represented as colours (gray, white and black). The local state is represented as a single value in a vertex, e.g., "1" in a gray vertex means that agent g has been given input value 1. The global states correspond to edges in the 2-agents case, and triangles in the 3-agents case. Notice that the simplicial complex on the right is an octahedron, that is, a triangulated sphere. More generally, it is known that the binary input simplicial complex for n + 1 agents is an n-dimensional sphere [32] .
Example 3
The toy example below illustrates the equivalence between epistemic models and simplicial models. The picture shows an epistemic model (left) and its associated simplicial model (right). No variable labelings are shown. The three agents, named g, w, b, are represented as colours gray, white and black on the vertices of the simplicial complex.
The three global states of the epistemic model correspond to the three triangles (i.e., 2dimensional facets) of the simplicial complex. The two states indistinguishable by agent b, are glued along their black vertex; while the two states indistinguishable by agents g and w are glued along the gray-and-white edge. The two functors κ and σ translating back and forth between the two kinds of models are defined formally in Section 3.3.
g, w b κ σ Example 4 (Asynchronous computation and subdivisions) We now give an example that illustrates how a simplicial model can change after communication. In Section 9 we explore change of information using action models. We describe here an important geometric operation on simplicial complexes called the chromatic subdivision. We describe it for 3 agents, but it generalizes to any number of agents. It appears in various distributed computing situations, where agents communicate by shared memory or message passing [32] . Consider three agents, represented with colours black, gray, white, and suppose that the black agent may receive as input value either 0 or 1, while the two other agents receive input 0. The two triangles on the left represent two facets of the input model, with input values 000 (green) and 100 (yellow). Now, suppose they communicate to each other their inputs, but in the following unreliable way. After communication, it is possible that an agent missed hearing the input value of one or two of the other agents. There are 4 possible patterns of communication, x, y, z, w, illustrated in the figure. Each pattern is defined by a table, with one row per agent. An agent x receives the value from agent y if and only if they are both on the same row, or x is in a row below that of y. After communication, we have the simplicial model on the right. Each vertex is labeled with a vector indicating which values it received.
The triangle x represents the situation where all agents heard their inputs (all 0 in this case) from each other, and intersects in an edge with the triangle y, where the black agent did not hear from the other two. Triangle x intersects only in a vertex with triangle w, where both the gray and the black heard from each other, but not from white. Triangle x also intersects in only one vertex with triangle z, where the black heard from no-one, gray heard only from black, and white heard from everybody.
Example 5 (Synchronous computation) Consider again black, white, and gray agents. They get inputs 012, respectively. Suppose they communicate to each other their inputs in a reliable way, but now, at most one of the agents may crash. Thus, when they communicate, it is possible that an agent missed hearing the input value of another agent, and in that case, it knows that this agent crashed. After communication, we have the simplicial model below. The center triangle represents the state where no one crashed, and each agent learned the inputs of every agent. The other edges represent the cases where one agent crashed, and that is why the dimension goes down. Thus, such global states are represented as edges instead of triangles. The local state of the crashed agent is no longer relevant. This is an example of synchronous computation, which has been thoroughly studied in distributed computing, see e.g. [32, chapter 13.5.2] .
The correspondence between epistemic models and simplicial models exhibited in [26] (and depicted in Example 3) can be extended to model various epistemic notions. We conclude this motivating section with an overview of novel ways presented in this contribution in which epistemic logic can be relevant to describe simplicial complexes, with pointers to further sections giving details.
• Locality. A crucial property that allows one to translate an epistemic model into a simplicial one is called locality (see Section 3.1). Intuitively, an epistemic model is local when each propositional variable talks only about the local state of one of the agents. This condition can be lifted in the case of finite epistemic models as demonstrated in [41] . In Section 6 we investigate the consequences of this solution for the information content of models, and what happens in the infinite case.
• Dynamics. A simplicial complex version of the action models found in dynamic epistemic logic was defined in [26] . In Section 9, we build on this idea in order to include the notion of factual change, which allows the values of propositional variables to be modified by the action model.
• Bisimulation. A central topic in modal logics is that of bisimulation between epistemic models. Bisimulation of simplicial models has been proposed in [24, 41] . We further discuss simplicial bisimulation in Section 4, and relate it with simplicial maps and covering spaces.
• Maps. In topology maps from one space to another are continuous functions, which in the case of simplicial complexes are simplicial maps. The simulations and bisimulations introduced in Section 4 are natural generalizations of simplicial maps, on condition that they are also value preserving. Then, in Section 8 we model the notion of belief (knowledge that may be incorrect) on simplicial complexes, by way of so-called belief functions that induce simplicial maps in an obvious way, however in that case they need not be value preserving, as beliefs may be incorrect.
• Topology. The most evident new feature of simplicial models is their geometric nature. Hence, one can analyze the topological structure of the underlying space, such as its high-dimensional connectivity (e.g. homotopy groups, representing its "holes"). Examples 1 and 2 make the geometric space evident that would be hard to see in an epistemic model.
The basic knowledge operator K a ϕ is intrinsically one-dimensional. However, higher dimensional structure in complexes can be described by, for example, group epistemic operators, such as the common distributed knowledge presented in Section 7 that can check truth on manifolds.
• Local semantics. In epistemic models the typical unit of interpretation is the (global) state, as in the semantics of epistemic logic on simplicial complexes presented in [26, 41] . However, there are far more relevant units of interpretation on simplicial complexes, as we should not be constrained to determine truth in facets only but should want to determine truth in simplices of any dimension. Already in Example 3, we see that there are 3 states, corresponding to three facets, while the total number of simplices is 17. Local interpretation on simplices is addressed in Section 5.
• Hierarchical structure. In distributed computing simplicial models often have a hierarchical structure, meaning that they are composed of submodels representing the behavior of systems with less agents, and hence of lower dimension. In Example 4, notice that the simplicial model on the right is a subdivision of the initial simplicial model, and furthermore, the green sub-complex is a subdivision of the initial green triangle, while the yellow sub-complex is a subdivision of the initial yellow triangle. Notice that whenever the white and gray agents do not hear from the black one, they cannot tell what its input was. Thus, the intersection C of both the green and the yellow complexes consists of three edges (and their vertices). This complex C is a subdivision of the initial edge, which is the intersection of the green and the yellow triangle. Hence, we can analyze a subcomplex C of C, of dimension 1, with an interesting semantic meaning: it represents a subsystem consisting of only two agents, white and gray. One can ask what the white and gray agents know on vertices or edges of C , as if the larger system of three agents did not exist.
This sort of semantics for edges instead of triangles is addressed in full generality in Section 6.1, as language-restricted local semantics.
• Variable number of agents. In distributed computing, whenever crashes are detectable, facets of different size may occur (see Example 5) . In epistemic logic such phenomena are modelled in logics of awareness and knowledge, and in particular the kind of unawareness known as unawareness of propositional variables, as in [19, 61] . A thorough treatment of this topic is deferred to future research. Another direction for future investigation are adjunctions between epistemic frames and simplicial complexes, that generalize the (equivalent) correspondence between frames and complexes of [26] .
For the sake of completeness, we also mention below some of the important features of simplicial models, even though we do not address them in the rest of the paper. They are not specific to the epistemic logic perspective, and have been thoroughly studied in distributed computing. See [32] for more detail.
• Topological invariants. As it turns out, there are topological invariants that are maintained starting from an initial simplicial model, after the agents communicate with each other. In the most basic case, illustrated in Example 4, the initial simplical model is subdivided, but in other situations where the communication is more reliable "holes" may be introduced, as in Example 5. Many other examples are described in [32] , and the notion of "holes" is formalized in terms of homotopy groups.
• Power of a computational model. The topological invariants preserved by the distributed model (number of failures, communication media, etc) in turn determine what the agents can distributively compute. After all, whatever computation an agent is performing, the outcome is a function of its local state. Thus, decisions induce a simplicial map from the simplicial complex representing what the agents know about the inputs after communication, to an output simplicial complex model representing what they are expected to compute based on that knowledge. This approach is developed in [26] .
• Specifications. In [26] it is explained how a simplicial model is used as knowledge that is supposed to be gained by a set of agents communicating with each other, via a simplicial map from the simplicial model at the end of the agent's communications.
3 Logical and topological tools
Logical tools
Given are a set A of n + 1 agents a 0 , . . . , a n (or a, b, . . . ) and a countable set P of (global) variables (or variables) p, q, p , q , . . . (possibly indexed).
Language The language of epistemic logic L K (A, P ) is defined as
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. We will write L K (P ) if A is clear from the context, and L K if A and P are clear from the context. For ¬p we may write p. Expression K a ϕ stands for 'agent a knows (that) ϕ.' The fragment without inductive construct K a ϕ is the language of propositional logic (also known as the Booleans) denoted L ∅ (A, P ). For ¬K a ¬ϕ we may write K a ϕ, for 'agent a considers it possible that ϕ.'
Epistemic models Epistemic frames are pairs M = (S, ∼) where S is the domain of (global) states, and ∼ is a function from the set of agents A to (binary) accessibility relations on S, that are required to be equivalence relations. For ∼ (a) we write ∼ a . Epistemic models are triples M = (S, ∼, L), where (S, ∼) is an epistemic frame and where valuation L is a function from S to P(P ). A pair (M, s) where s ∈ S is a pointed epistemic model. We also distinguish the multi-pointed epistemic model (M, S ) where S ⊆ S. For (s, t) ∈ ∼ a we write s ∼ a t, and for {t | s ∼ a t} we write [s] a : this is an equivalence class of the relation ∼ a . We now introduce terminology for epistemic models for distributed systems. Given an epistemic model M = (S, ∼, L), a variable p ∈ P is local for agent a ∈ A iff for all s, t ∈ S, if s ∼ a t then p ∈ L(s) iff p ∈ L(t). Variable p is local iff it is local for some agent a, and a model M is local iff all variables are local. We write P a for the set of local variables for agent a, i.e., P a = {p ∈ P | for all s, t ∈ S, if s ∼ a t, then p ∈ L(s) iff p ∈ L(t)}. If an epistemic model is local, then P a = P . Without loss of generality we may assume that all members of {P a 0 , . . . , P an } are mutually disjoint, and that members of each P a are subindexed with the agent name as in: p a , p a , q a , . . .
We can also approach locality from the other direction. Let mutually disjoint sets S a 0 . . . S an of local states and mutually disjoint sets P a 0 , . . . , P an of local variables (for resp. agents a 0 , . . . , a n ) be given. Let for each a ∈ A, L a : S a → P(P a ) be a valuation for the local states of agent a. A distributed model is an epistemic model (S, ∼, L) such that:
• for all a ∈ A and s, t ∈ S: s ∼ a t iff s a = t a ;
• for all a ∈ A and s ∈ S:
In other words, each global state s ∈ S is an (n + 1)-tuple s = (s 0 , . . . , s n ) of local states for the agents 0, . . . , n respectively. An epistemic model is factual if all global states have different valuations, i.e., if for all s, t ∈ S there is a p ∈ P such that p ∈ L(s) and p / ∈ L(t), or p / ∈ L(s) and p ∈ L(t).
Semantics on epistemic models The interpretation of a formula ϕ ∈ L K in a global state of a given pointed model (M, s) is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The expression "M, s |= ϕ" stands for "in global state s of epistemic model M it holds that ϕ." 
Informally, this means that these pointed models contain the same information. We let
Standard references for epistemic logic are [44, 20, 62] . The typical example of proper factual local epistemic models are interpreted systems [20] .
Topological tools
We continue by introducing simplicial complexes and other topological tools. A reference on algebraic topology is [30] , on a more combinatorial approach there are [18, 39] , and on the use of combinatorial topology in distributed computing it is [32] . Subsequently and in the next subsection we review results from [26] , that are also reported in [41] .
Simplicial complexes Given a set of vertices V (sometimes also called local states; singular form vertex), a (simplicial) complex C is a set of non-empty finite subsets of V , called simplices (singular form simplex), that is closed under subsets (such that for all
The facets of a complex C are denoted as F(C), and the vertices of a complex C are denoted as V(C). The dimension of a simplex X is |X| − 1, e.g., vertices are of dimension 0, while edges are of dimension 1. The dimension of a complex is the maximal dimension of its facets. A simplicial complex is pure if all facets have the same dimension. A manifold is a pure simplicial complex C of dimension n such that: (i) for any X, Y ∈ F(C) there are facets X = X 0 , . . . , X m = Y such that for all i < m the dimension of X i ∩ X i+i is n − 1 (this is a 'path' from X to Y in C), and (ii) any simplex Z ∈ C of dimension n − 1 is a face of one or two facets of C (those that are faces of only one facet form the boundary of C).
We decorate the vertices of simplicial complexes with agent's names, that we refer to as colours. A chromatic map from the vertices of C to A assigning colours to vertices is denoted χ. Thus, χ(v) ∈ A denotes that the local state v belongs to agent a. Different vertices of the same simplex should be assigned different colours. The vertex of a simplex X coloured with a is denoted X a . A pair consisting of a simplicial complex and a colouring map χ is a chromatic simplicial complex.
From now on, all simplicial complexes will be chromatic pure simplicial complexes.
Simplicial models We now also decorate the vertices of simplicial complexes with local variables p a ∈ P a for a ∈ A, where we recall that a∈A P a = P (all sets of local variables are assumed to be disjoint). While chromatic maps are denoted χ, χ , . . . , valuations (valuation maps) assigning sets of local variables to vertices are denoted , , . . . For any X ∈ C,
Simplicial maps Given simplicial complexes C and C , a simplicial map (simplicial function) is a function f :
A chromatic simplicial map is a colour preserving simplicial map, where colour preserving means that for all v ∈ V(C), χ(f (v)) = χ(v). We note that it is therefore also rigid. Let now C = (C, χ, ) and C = (C , χ , ) be simplicial models. A chromatic simplicial map f between the complexes C and C is also called a simplicial map between the models C and C . The simplicial map f is value preserving if for all v ∈ V(C), (f (v)) = (v). If f is not only colour preserving but also value preserving, and its inverse f −1 as well, then C and C are isomorphic, notation C C . It is customary to define isomorphy between simplicial complexes instead of between simplicial models. However, we will later define a bisimulation as a relation between simplicial models, such that isomorphy implies bisimilarity but not necessarily vice versa. We therefore defined isomorphy between simplicial models.
Epistemic logic on simplicial models
Semantics on simplicial models The interpretation of a formula ϕ ∈ L K (A, P ) in a facet X ∈ F(C) of a given simplicial model C = (C, χ, ) is by induction on the structure of ϕ. Merely the clause for knowledge looks different than that on epistemic models.
Validity and modal equivalence are also defined similarly. Formula ϕ is valid iff for all (C, X), C, X |= ϕ; and given (C, X) and (C , X ), by (C, X) ≡ (C , X ) we mean that for all
Correspondence between simplicial models and epistemic models Given agents A and variables P , let K be the class of local proper epistemic models and let S be the class of simplicial models. In [26] , simplicial models are shown to correspond to local proper epistemic models by showing that the underlying proper epistemic frames and simplicial complexes correspond (categorically) via functions (functors) σ : K → S (σ for S implicial) and κ : S → K (κ for K ripke), and then extending σ and κ in the obvious way, such that they are also valuation preserving, to models. The correspondence uses the observed relation between local proper epistemic models and distributed models. These are the details.
Given a local proper epistemic model
Given a simplicial model C = (C, χ, ), we define an epistemic κ(M) = (S, ∼, L) as follows. Its domain S consists of states κ(X) for all X ∈ F(C). We define κ(X) ∼ a κ(Y ) iff a ∈ X ∩ Y , and p a ∈ L(κ(X)) iff p a ∈ (X). We note that κ(M) is local and proper.
One can now show that: 
Bisimulation for simplicial complexes
If two models are isomorphic, they make the same formulas true, i.e., they contain the same information (what we also called modally equivalent). In modal logic and concurrency theory, a weaker form of sameness than isomorphy already guarantees that, bisimilarity [4, 10, 55, 57, 66] . As truth is invariant under bisimulation, it is an important way to determine whether structures contain the same information. In distributed computing by way of combinatorial topology, bisimulation between simplicial models has been proposed in [25, 41] . We present and further explore this notion, and demonstrate its adequacy with respect to bisimulation for epistemic models. This may be considered of interest, for example, if different subdivisions of complexes are shown to be bisimilar, then they contain the same information after all. We first define the standard notion of bisimulation between epistemic models, and then bisimulation between simplicial models.
Bisimulation between epistemic models A bisimulation between M = (S, ∼, L) and M = (S , ∼ , L ), notation R : M ↔ M , is a non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S such that for all s ∈ S, s ∈ S with Rss the following three conditions are satisfied:
• atoms: for all p ∈ P , p ∈ L(s) iff p ∈ L (s ).
• forth: for all a ∈ A, for all t with s ∼ a t, there is a t with s ∼ a t such that Rtt .
• back: for all a ∈ A, for all t with s ∼ a t , there is a t with s ∼ a t such that Rtt .
A bisimulation R such that for all s ∈ S there is a s ∈ S such that Rss and for all s ∈ S there is a s ∈ S such that Rss is a total bisimulation. If there is a bisimulation R between M and M we say that M and M are bisimilar, denoted M ↔ M . A bisimulation between pointed models (M, s) and (M , s ) is a bisimulation R such that Rss , notation R : (M, s) ↔ (M , s ), and if there is such a bisimulation we write (M, s) ↔ (M , s ). A model is bisimulation minimal if the only total bisimulation on that model (i.e., between the model and itself) is the identity relation.
Bisimulation between simplicial models Let be given simplicial models C = (C, χ, ) and C = (C , χ , ). A non-empty relation R between F(C) and F(C ) is a (simplicial) bisimulation between C and C , notation R : C ↔ C , iff for all Y ∈ F(C) and Y ∈ F(C ) with RY Y the following three conditions are satisfied:
• atoms: for all a ∈ A and p a ∈ P a , p a ∈ (Y ) iff p a ∈ (Y ).
A total simplicial bisimulation R is a simplicial bisimulation such that for all X ∈ F(C) there is a X ∈ V(C ) with RXX and for all X ∈ F(C ) there is a X ∈ F(C) with RXX . If there is a bisimulation between C and C we write C ↔ C . A bisimulation between pointed simplicial models (C, X) and (C , X ), where X ∈ F(C) and X ∈ F(C ), is a bisimulation R such that RXX , notation R : (C, X) ↔ (C , X ), and if there is such a bisimulation we write (C, X) ↔ (C , X ). Relation R is a simulation if it satisfies the atoms and the forth conditions.
Intuitively, the forth-clause preserves ignorance when going from C to C , and the back-clause preserves knowledge when going from C to C .
A relation R : F(C) → F(C ) between facets induces a (similarly denoted) colour preserving relation R : V(C) → V(C ) between vertices by way of: if RXX then for all a ∈ A, RX a X a . Dually, given a relation R : V(C) → V(C ) between vertices that is chromatic, i.e., colour preserving (if Rvv then χ(v) = χ(v )), then for any simplices X, X with χ(X) = χ(X ), RXX denotes that for all a ∈ χ(X), RX a X a .
As bisimulations between simplicial models are relations between facets, and as facets correspond to global states in epistemic models, such bisimulations are very much like bisimulations between epistemic models.
The reader may wonder why bisimulations between simplicial models are not defined between vertices instead of between facets, and with the back and forth conditions only required between vertices. This is undesirable, because if we were to do so, then different simplicial models with the same 1-dimensional skeleton could incorrectly become bisimilar. Example 9 illustrates how this can go wrong. Similar counterexamples can easily be found if we merely require back and forth for simplices of dimension m smaller than the dimension n of the complex. This demonstrates that back and forth need to be required for facets.
More interestingly, now suppose bisimulations between simplicial models were defined as relations between vertices but with the back and forth conditions between facets. This is also undesirable: although a relation between facets induces a (unique) relation between vertices, different relations between facets may induce the same relation between vertices. Therefore, only specifying the relation between vertices does not determine a relation between facets. However, there is a unique maximal such relation, defined as: for all facets X and X , RXX iff for all a ∈ A, RX a X a . Example 10 illustrates this.
Given a bisimulation, its induced chromatic relation between vertices interestingly compares to chromatic simplicial maps. We recall the notion of chromatic simplicial map as a colour and simplex preserving function between the vertices of a complex. Given C = (C, χ, ) and C = (C , χ , ), we will call a relation R between vertices simplex preserving if for all X ∈ C with X in the domain of R there is a X ∈ C such that RXX . It is easy to see that a bisimulation R between simplicial models induces a relation R between vertices that is simplex preserving and such that its converse relation
with RXX is therefore a face of Y and thus a simplex. Similarly, using that back is satisfied for R we show that R −1 is simplex preserving. It seems interesting to explore how a bisimulation can be seen as a generalization of a chromatic simplicial map. Note that the atoms requirement corresponds to the value preservation of the simplicial map. In Propositions 13 and 14, later, we also address the relation between bisimulations (and simulations) and simplicial maps. Example 9 It is not sufficient only to require forth and back for lower dimensional simplices, e.g., for edges only. For a counterexample, consider the following simplicial models C and C (and with valuations as depicted). Simplicial model C consists of four facets/triangles, whereas simplicial model C consists of three facets (the middle triangle {a1, b1, c1} is not a facet). The 1-skeletons of C and C (checking forth and back only for edges of triangles) are bisimilar by way of the relation R mapping vertices with the same colour and value. However, C and C are not bisimilar, because no facet of C is bisimilar to F 4 in C.
Example 10 Consider three one-dimensional complexes C = (C, χ, ), C = (C , χ , ), and C = (C , χ , ) for two agents a, b, where we assume that a has the same value everywhere, and that b also has the same value everywhere.
Clearly, they are all bisimilar. Two different bisimulations between C and C are:
Relations R and R induce the same relation between vertices, namely relating every a vertex in C to every a vertex in C , and every b vertex in C to every b vertex in C . This demonstrates that the same relation between vertices may be consistent with different relations between facets. The relation R is the maximal bisimulation between C and C . Assuming the relation by vertices as primitive, we can define also define R as: for all facets X and X , R XX iff (R X a X a and R X b X b ).
Both C and C are bisimilar to the single-edged complex C . This complex is bisimulation minimal (C can be seen as the quotient of C, and of C , with respect to bisimilarity).
Subdivision Subdivisions typically do not result in bisimilar complexes. Consider the two simplicial models for agents a, b below, where the edge with labels 1 is subdivided into three edges, while the other two edges of this simplicial model are not subdivided. These two simplicial models are not bisimilar. Clearly, because of atoms, the facet a1--b1 on the left must be in relation with a facet a1--b1 on the right. Which one? If we choose a1--b1 b1 b1 on the right, then forth fails because the adjoining b1--a2 on the left cannot be related to b1 b1 b1--a1 a1 a1 on the right, as the values of the a vertices are different. If we choose b1 b1 b1--a1 a1 a1 on the right, then forth fails because the adjoining b0--a1 on the left cannot be related to a1 a1 a1--b1 on the right, as the values of the b vertices are different. Finally and again similarly, if we choose a1 a1 a1--b1 on the right, then back fails, as b0--a1 and b1 b1 b1--a1 are not related.
We can also come to this conclusion in a different way: if the respective complexes have different properties of knowledge, then they are not bisimilar (Proposition 12, later). We now note, for example, that in the complex on the right in vertex b1 b1 b1 agent b knows that the value of a is 1, whereas on the left agent b is uncertain about the value of a if his value is 1. Similarly, a1 a1 a1 on the right is the unique vertex where a knows that the value of b is 1.
However, sometimes subdivisions result in bisimilar complexes. For example, if, instead, a1--b1 were the unique edge of a simplicial model, then its subdivision must be bisimilar, as below:
Similarly, for dimension 2, the left complex below consists of a single facet, and it is bisimilar to its subdivision on the right (by connecting vertices with the same colour), where we assume that all vertices of the same colour satisfy the same local variable(s). Bisimulation may be a useful tool to determine whether seemingly similar simplicial complexes contain the same information. As well known, this can be determined in quadratic time with respect to the size of the models (i.e., complexes). Another use may be to determine whether, given some initial complex, clearly different subdivisions (where agents have different knowledge, such as a knows p in one but never in the other, and b knows q in the other but never in the one) both have subsequent subdivisions resulting, after all, in bisimilar complexes again. This is the property known as confluence, or Church-Rosser. Isomorphy is then often a bridge too far, but bisimilarity may be all we need.
We close this section with some elementary results for bisimulations between complexes. We recall the maps κ : S → K and σ : K → S between the simplicial models and the proper local epistemic models. We now have the following.
Proposition 11 Let M, M ∈ K, let C, C ∈ S. Then: The clause forth holds: Let σ(t) ∈ F(σ(M)) such that a ∈ χ(σ(s) ∩ σ(t)). From the definition of σ(M) we get that s ∼ a t. Therefore, given R σ(s)σ(s ) and therefore Rss , and as R is a bisimulation, there is t ∈ M such that s ∼ a t and Rtt . We now choose σ(t ) ∈ F(σ(M )) to obtain R σ(t)σ(t ) and a ∈ χ(σ(s ) ∩ σ(t )), as required.
The back step is similar. The proof of the second item is also fairly similar. The last two items follow from the first two items, but also directly from M κ(σ(M)) and C σ(κ(M)): isomorphy is stronger than bisimilarity, and bisimilarity is transitive.
These results extend the known results that κ(σ(M)) M and that σ(κ(C)) C from [26] (Prop. 6) in the expected way. Clearly, we also have such correspondence between pointed simplicial complexes, for example, σ(κ(C, X)) ↔ σ(κ(C , X )), where X is a facet in the complex of C and X is a facet in the complex of C .
Also for simplicial complexes, bisimilarity implies modal equivalence, and for finite complexes the implication also holds in the other direction, as is to be expected. It is often assumed in combinatorial topology and in distributed computing that complexes are finite, but not always. Interesting applications exist for the infinite case [2] . Proposition 12 Let (C, X) and (C , X ) be given, with C = (C, χ, ) and C = (C , χ , ). Then:
Let now, additionally, the sets of vertices of C and C be finite. Then:
Proof These proofs are elementary. Let us show the second item.
Define relation R : F(C) × F(C ) as: for all X ∈ F(C) and X ∈ F(C ), RXX if (C, X) ≡ (C , X ). We show that R is a bisimulation.
Let RXX be arbitrary. First consider condition atoms. For all p a ∈ P , p a ∈ (X) iff p a ∈ (X ), because
Therefore it is not the case that (C, X) ≡ (C , X ). This contradicts the assumption RXX .
The condition back is shown similarly.
Given complexes C and C , let f : V(C) → V(C ) be a chromatic simplicial map. The relation R ⊆ V(C) × V(C ) defined as, for all x ∈ V(C) and x ∈ V(C ), R xy iff f (x) = y is called the induced relation. Also, as R is functional, this, in its turn, induces a unique relation R between facets (in the usual way). We recall that a simplicial map is value preserving between simplicial models iff for all v ∈ V(C), (f (v)) = (v) (where is the valuation on C and that on C ). We now have that:
The induced relation R of a value preserving chromatic simplicial map f between simplicial models C and C is a simulation.
Proof The proof is elementary.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 13, if both f and f −1 are value preserving chromatic simplicial maps, then the induced relation R, that determines a unique relation between facets as it is functional, is a bisimulation between C and C . This bisimulation is an isomorphism.
Covering complex As explained by Hatcher [30] , algebraic topology can be roughly defined as the study of techniques for forming algebraic images of topological spaces. Thus, continuous maps between spaces are projected onto homomorphisms between their algebraic images, so topologically related spaces have algebraically related images. One of the simplest and most important functors of algebraic topology, the fundamental group, which creates an algebraic image of a space from the loops in the space (i.e., paths starting and ending at the same point). The fundamental group of a space X X X is defined so that its elements are loops in X X X starting and ending at a fixed basepoint x 0 ∈ X X X , but two such loops are regarded as determining the same element of the fundamental group if one loop can be continuously deformed into the other within the space X X X. There is a very deep connection between the fundamental group and covering spaces, and they can be regarded as two viewpoints toward the same thing [54] . This means that algebraic features of the fundamental group can often be translated into the geometric language of covering spaces. Roughly speaking, a space Y Y Y is called a covering space of X X X if Y Y Y maps onto X X X in a locally homeomorphic way, so that the pre-image of every point in X X X has the same cardinality. We consider the combinatorial version of covering complex [54] , extended to the epistemic setting. Let C = (C, χ, ) and C = (C , χ , ) be simplicial models. An epistemic covering complex of C is a pair (C, f ) where C is a connected complex and f : C → C is a value preserving simplical map such that for every simplex X in C , f −1 (X) is a union of pairwise disjoint simplices. We observe that C is the image of f . Hence, C is also connected.
Applications of covering spaces to distributed computing are explored in [22] , and this is an example. In the figure we assume that a vertex v and f (v) have the same valuations, and an edge in C is sent by f to the edge of the same label in C .
Proposition 14
If (C, f ) is an epistemic covering complex of C then there is a total bisimulation between C and C .
Proof By Proposition 13 the induced relation R of f : C → C is a simulation from C to C . It is easy to see that the back property holds as well.
Local semantics for simplicial complexes
In [26] the semantics of knowledge on simplicial complexes employs a satisfaction relation between a pair consisting of a simplicial model and a facet of that model, and a formula.
However, in combinatorial topology we not only wish to determine what is true in a facet, but also what is true in any simplex. We wish a more local semantics. There are two roads towards such local semantics for simplicial complexes. There is another road from a local semantics for simplices to the special case of facets.
From semantics for facets to semantics for simplices
Multi-pointed local semantics In the first place, just as in Kripke semantics, we can define the satisfaction relation between multi-pointed simplicial models and formulas, instead of between pointed simplicial complexes and formulas, using that for any face of dimension m < n, there is a unique set of facets that contain it (we recall that we only consider pure complexes).
A multi-pointed simplicial model (C, X X X) is a pair consisting of a simplicial model C = (C, χ, ) and a set X X X of facets X ∈ F(C). The satisfaction relation for such sets of facets is easily defined in the obvious way.
C, X X X |= ϕ iff C, X |= ϕ for all X ∈ X X X Consequently, given any simplex Y ⊆ C of C, and the set X X X := {X ∈ F(C) | Y ⊆ X} of facets containing it as a face, we can define the local truth in Y as follows.
C, Y |= ϕ iff C, X |= ϕ for all X ∈ F(C) with Y ⊆ X Example 15 Consider the simplicial model depicted below, where, as before, for the convenience of the exposition the vertices have been labelled with the colour/agent i and the value of the single local proposition p i for that agent, where 0 means that p i is false and 1 means that p i is true, and where as names of these vertices we use such pairs. Let further X = {a0, c1, b1}, Y = {a1, c1, b1}, and Z = {a1, c1, b0} be the three facets of the complex, as also suggestively depicted. We now have that C, X |= K a ¬p a , but C, {b1, c1} |= K a ¬p a . As {b1, c1} = X ∩ Y , C, {b1, c1} |= ϕ is equivalent to (C, X |= ϕ and C, Y |= ϕ). And from C, Y |= K a p a it follows that C, Y |= K a ¬p a , and thus C, {b1, c1} |= K a ¬p a . The edge {b1, c1} represents that agents b and c are uncertain about what a knows. Similarly, in vertex c1, agent c, who there knows that p c , is uncertain between valuations ¬p a ∧ p b ∧ p c , p a ∧ p b ∧ p c , and p a ∧ ¬p b ∧ p c . This is described by
In particular, from this it also follows that C, c1 |= K c (p a ∨ p b ). Although c considers it possible that p a is false, and also considers it possible that p b is false, she does not consider it possible that both are false.
Language-restricted local semantics
There is also another, slightly more winding, road to a local semantics for simplicial models. This involves restricting the language as well: when interpreting a formula in a simplex, we then only allow knowledge modalities and local variables for the colours of that simplex. Given the language L K (A, P ), where P = a∈A P a , and given a simplicial model C = (C, χ, ) and a simplex X ∈ C, satisfaction C, X |= ϕ is only defined for formulas ϕ in the language restricted to agents in χ(X) and to local variables for those agents. In other words, we then only formalize what the agents in χ(X) know and do not know about themselves and about their own local variables, and not what they know about other agents or their local variables, or about what those other agents know. (Similar restrictions abound in game theory and computational social choice [12] .) This comes with the following semantics.
The relation |= between a pair (C, X) and ϕ is defined for ϕ ∈ L K (χ(X), P |χ(X)), where P |χ(X) := a∈χ(X) P a , by induction on the structure of ϕ. The non-obvious two clauses are as follows. The language restriction implies that, below, the a in p a and in K a must be in the set of colours χ(X).
Instead of defining this syntactically, we can also define this semantically, as follows. Let C = (C, χ, ) be a simplicial model for agents A, and A ⊆ A a subset of agents. The restriction C|A of C to A is the simplicial model obtained from C by keeping only the vertices coloured by A , i.e., C|A = (C , χ , ) where C = {X ∈ C | χ(X) ⊆ A }, where for all X ∈ C , χ (X) = χ(X), and where for all p a ∈ P a with a ∈ A and for all v ∈ V(C ), p a ∈ (v) iff p a ∈ (v). We note that C is again a pure chromatic simplicial complex and that its dimension is |A | − 1. The language restricted local semantics above is just the regular semantics in C|A , for formulas in the language L K (A , P |A ). In other words, for all ϕ ∈ L K (A , P |A ):
C, X |= ϕ iff C|χ(X), X |= ϕ Example 16 Reconsider Example 15. We now have that C, {b1, c1} |= K a ¬p a and C, c1 |= K c (p a ∨ p b ) are undefined, because a / ∈ χ({b1, c1}) = {b, c} respectively a / ∈ χ({c1}), i.e., a = c. However, we have that C, {b1, c1} |= K b p c ∧ ¬K c p b and, less interestingly, as this is 'all that c knows', that C, c1 |= K c p c .
Let us write |= mp for the satisfaction relation in the 'multi-pointed local semantics' and |= lr for that in the 'language-restricted local semantics'. Then truth with respect to the latter is preserved as truth with respect the former, which is desirable.
Proposition 17 Let ϕ ∈ L K (X). Then C, X |= lr ϕ iff C, X |= mp ϕ.
Proof The proof is by induction on ϕ where the only relevant case is the one for knowledge:
Let us assume that C, X |= lr K a ϕ, i.e., for all Y ∈ C with χ(X) = χ(Y ) and a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y ), C, Y |= lr ϕ. We wish to prove that C, X |= mp K a ϕ. In order to prove that, using the |= mp semantics, assume that Z ∈ F(C) with X ⊆ Z, and, using the semantics for knowledge, let V ∈ F(C) with a ∈ χ(Z ∩ V ). It then remains to show that C, V |= mp ϕ. Let now Y ⊆ V with χ(Y ) = χ(X). Note that, as a ∈ χ(X), therefore also a ∈ χ(Y ).
From that, the initial assumption C, X |= lr K a ϕ and the |= lr semantics it now follows that C, Y |= lr ϕ. By inductive hypothesis it now follows that C, Y |= mp ϕ, and from the |= mp semantics and Y ⊆ V ∈ F(C) it then follows that C, V |= mp ϕ, as required.
Conversely, assume that C,
Similar to the reasoning in the other direction, for any Y ⊆ V with χ(Y ) = χ(X) and a ∈ χ(Y ) we must have that a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y ), such that by definition of |= mp we obtain C, Y |= mp ϕ, and with induction we can then conclude C, Y |= lp ϕ, as required.
Local semantics for distributed epistemic models One can just as well consider a similar local semantics for distributed epistemic models. Let M = (S, ∼, L) be a distributed model for agents A and variables P = a∈A P a , so that states s ∈ S have shape s = (s a 0 , . . . , s an ). Given such s ∈ S, by s ⊆ B s we mean that s is the restriction of s to the agents B ⊆ A. For example, (s a 1 , s a 2 ) ⊆ {a 1 ,a 2 } (s a 0 , s a 1 , s a 2 ). We now can, similarly to above, either define, in multi-pointed fashion, that M, s|B |= ϕ iff (for all s ∈ S with s |B = s|B: M, s |= ϕ), or define, in restricted-language fashion, M, s|B |= ϕ by induction on ϕ ∈ L(B, P |B). Again, truth in the latter is preserved as truth in the former.
A semantics for simplices including facets
A more rigorous departure from the semantics where the evaluation point is a facet are the following alternative semantics for arbitrary simplices as evaluation points, of which the case for facets is merely an instantiation.
Given are agents A and variables P = a∈A P a . Let C = (C, χ, ) be a simplicial model, X ∈ C, and ϕ ∈ L(A, P ). Similar to before for facets, we extend the usage of to include arbitrary simplices as: p ∈ (X) iff there is a v ∈ X with p ∈ (v).
The special case of the knowledge semantics for vertices therefore is:
Elementary results corroborating this more general perspective of this semantics are:
Both are easily shown by induction on ϕ. Proposition 18 says, in other words, that if ϕ is true in simplex X then it is true in the star of X.
6 From global to local epistemic models Propositions 6 and 7 in Section 3 reported how epistemic models correspond to simplicial models, however on the assumption that the epistemic models are local. We now investigate when epistemic models that are not local can be transformed into local epistemic models that contain the same information. It is easy to see that changing the domain or the epistemic relations of an epistemic model can result in change of information content, so that the only option is to adjust the valuation by replacing the global variables with local variables.
Given epistemic model M = (S, ∼, L) for agents A and variables P we therefore wish to construct a local epistemic model M = (S, ∼, L ) for agents A and variables P containing the same information, i.e., for all
In general, as known from [26] , this quest cannot succeed. A simple counterexample is the improper epistemic model We have lost information. However, on other epistemic models this quest succeeds. For example, consider the following (proper) model for two agents a, b and one variable p.
We note that p is not local for a and also not local for b. Now consider:
for variables q a , q b . This model is local. As both models are finite and bisimulation minimal, all subsets of the domain are obviously definable in both languages and can thus be made to correspond. We can do this systematically for all formulas by, for example, replacing all occurrences of p by (q a ∧ q b ) ∨ (q a ∧ q b ) in any formula in the language with p, and in the other direction by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of q a by ¬K a p and of q b by K b p in the language with q a , q b .
In [41] the following method is proposed to make arbitrary finite epistemic models local. Given M = (S, ∼, L) for variables P , consider novel variables P = {p in M (see [41] ). Dually, on bisimulation minimal epistemic models, the denotation of any p
in M is the same as the of t∈[s]a δ t in M, in the original language L K (P ). This solution is reminiscent of hybrid logic [9] wherein all states have names, and in particular of the enrichment of models in symbolic model checking [58, 13] . This method may result in many more propositional variables. Also, on epistemic models that are not bisimulation minimal, the model with variables p [s]a a is not bisimilar to the initial model and then contains more information, as in the following example. As said, we aim at a transformation that is information preserving in both directions. Therefore, the method from [41] is not what we want. We therefore investigated alternative ways to make models local. Before we can report on that, we need to introduce an additional technical tool: the distinguishing formula.
Distinguishing formulas Given a subset S ⊆ S of the domain, a distinguishing formula for S is a formula in some logical language typically denoted δ S , such that: for all s ∈ S , M, s |= ϕ whereas for all s ∈ S , M, s |= ϕ. A distinguishing formula for a singleton S = {s} is a distinguishing formula for s. If M is finite (a model is finite if its domain is finite) and bisimulation minimal, a distinguishing formula always exists in L K (A, P ) for any state. We can construct it as follows [60] . 
Consider the relation R defined by Rst if for all n ∈ N, M, t |= δ n s . If the model is finite, the relation R is a bisimulation, and for all n ≥ |S|, δ n+1 s and δ n s have the same denotation. We therefore take δ |S| s as distinguishing formula δ s for state s. References for distinguishing formulas in epistemic logic are [56, 60] .
Distinguishing formulas with local variables Let us now adapt procedure (1) 
The procedure is now in the language with local variables P = {p τ [s]a a | s ∈ S, a ∈ A}. In the sequel, in order to simplify notation, we may write ϕ a for any propositional formula ϕ equivalent to τ [s]a .
Example 21 Continuing the above example for three states, the following local model is created. As p ∨ ¬p is equivalent to , we write a instead of p p∨¬p a , etc., and we only depict the valuations.
The resulting distinguishing formulas are
Also taking into account that agents know their local variables, an alternative description is:
Recalling the relation defined as: Rst if for all n ∈ N, M, t |= δ n s , it is unclear if on any given model it is a bisimulation with the new local variables if and only if it is a bisimulation with the old global variables. We conjecture that on finite models R is again a bisimulation, thus achieving our aim to construct a local epistemic model with the same information content as any given epistemic model. We further conjecture that on any given epistemic model where R is a bisimulation but not so with the local variables, no local epistemic model exists with the same information content. Example 22 demonstrates this for an infinite model.
Example 22
Consider the following (image-finite) infinite chain M.
Let us name the states 0, 1, . . . from left to right. The model M with local variables is:
State 0 is the unique state where K b ¬p. All finite subsets of the chain can be distinguished by their relation to this endpoint, and therefore in particular all equivalence classes of relations ∼ a and ∼ b , i.e., all local states of a and b. As an example, we show how three local b-states and three local a-states are described in the language for the local variables corresponding to booleans of the single variable p. For a local state consisting of states j and k we write jk, etc. eq. class distinguishing formula 01
The variable p is true in all odd states. However, this subset of the domain is not definable in the language with local variables. In other words, there is a ϕ ∈ L K ({a, b}, {p}, namely ϕ = p, such that for all
The models M and M do not contain the same information.
7 Group epistemic notions for simplicial complexes 7.1 Mutual, common, and distributed knowledge Apart from individual knowledge, group knowledge plays an important role in epistemic logic. There are three well-known kinds of group knowledge. In the first place, there is the notion representing that everybody knows a proposition, also known as mutual knowledge [44, 20, 45] . 1 Then, there is the notion of common knowledge of a proposition, which entails not merely that everybody knows it, but also that everybody knows that everybody knows it, and so on [23, 42, 65] . Finally, the agents have distributed knowledge of a proposition if, intuitively (but not technically), they can get to know it by communication [31, 27] . 2 This notion is less well studied than the other two. This is somewhat surprising, particularly in the context of distributed systems with communicating agents.
Syntax The notions of mutual, common, and distributed knowledge are formalized by operators E B , C B , and D B , respectively. Mutual knowledge E B ϕ, for B ⊆ A, is typically defined by abbreviation as a∈B K a ϕ and only introduced as a primitive language construct for investigations of succinctness and complexity. Whereas C B ϕ and D B ϕ need to be additional inductive constructs in the logical language in order to be able to give a semantics for these notions. Expression D B ϕ stands for 'the group of agents B have distributed knowledge of ϕ,' and expression C B ϕ stands for 'the group of agents B have common knowledge of ϕ.' Both common knowledge and distributed knowledge are known to enlarge the expressivity of corresponding logics, although in different ways, and to handle distributed knowledge we even need a stronger notion of bisimulation, that may serve us surprisingly well for a generalization of simplicial complexes.
Semantics Given some epistemic model with relations ∼ a for a ∈ A, we define ∼ ∩ B := a∈B ∼ a , and ∼ * B := ( a∈B ∼ a ) * , where B ⊆ A. Both these relations are also equivalence relations. The semantics of common knowledge and of distributed knowledge on epistemic models is now as follows.
It is straightforward to interpret distributed and common knowledge on simplicial models. Let C = (C, χ, ) be a simplicial model (for A and P ), and let X ∈ F(C). To interpret common knowledge C B , define operation * B for all B ⊆ A inductively as: for all X, Y, Z ∈ F(C), X ∈ * B (X), and if Y ∈ * B (X) and B ∩ χ(Z ∩ Y ) = ∅, then Z ∈ * B (X). Then:
Example 23 We recall the simplicial models C and C from Example 9. We now evaluate some propositions involving common and distributed knowledge.
• Let us investigate what a and b commonly know in facet F 1 in C . To determine common knowledge of a and b in F 1 , the commonly known proposition needs to be true in all F i bordering on edges of the ab-path: a0-b1-a1-b0, i.e., in all of F 1 , F 2 , F 3 . In other words, it has to be (in this particular example) a model validity.
We now have that C , F 1 |= C ab (K c p c → (K a ¬p a ∨ K b ¬p b )), as the formula bound by C ab is true for all F 1 , F 2 , F 3 . However, C,
namely not in F 2 where c knows ¬p c . And for yet another example we have that C, 
Bisimulation for distributed knowledge
As such, distributed knowledge seems uninteresting on simplicial models, as in any facet of a simplicial model the agents always have distributed knowledge of what is true in that facet (although for proper subsets of all agents distributed knowledge may already be slightly more interesting). Dually, in proper epistemic models, the intersection of all relations is the identity relation (although, also dually, the relation ∼ ∩ B for B = A need not be the identity). Somewhat surprisingly, explorations concerning distributed knowledge still seem of large interest to describe the information content of simplicial complexes.
The natural generalization of bisimulation including relations interpreting distributed knowledge not only contains forth and back clauses for individual agents but now for any group of agents [53, 1] . Given Rss , we recall the forth clause:
We now get:
there is a t with s ∼ ∩ B t such that Rtt . This notion of bisimulation is stronger (for a given model it is a more refined relation) than bisimulation for relations ∼ a for individual agents only. See Example 24. This stronger notion may be useful to elicit information from simplical sets, a generalization of simplicial complexes, as illustrated in Example 25.
Example 24
The typical example where this stronger bisimulation makes a difference is that it distinguishes the following epistemic models. In the top-right and bottom-left corner of the square model, agents a and b have distributed knowledge of p; we note that ∼ a ∩ ∼ b is the identity relation. The two models are (standardly) bisimilar, but not with the additional clause for the group of agents {a, b}: in the left one we can then go from a p to a ¬p state by a ∼ ∩ ab link, but not in the right one, so the forth clause fails for {a, b}.
Example 25 (Distributed knowledge for simplicial sets) As the models in the previous example are not local, they do not correspond to a simplicial complex. And as the disjunction of the values in indistinguishable states always is the uninformative value 'true', there is no transformation to a local epistemic model (see Section 5) . The only obvious representation is simplicial model (i) below, where the name a01 suggestively stands for a vertex coloured with a and valued with the indistinguishable set {¬p, p}. A similar quadrangular simplicial model represents that four-state epistemic model. But it is bisimilar to (i).
Distributed knowledge may now be helpful. In model (y), the coalition {a, b} (for which we will write ab) can distinguish all four states, we have that p → D ab p and ¬p → D ab ¬p are both true. Now consider adding this coalition as a third agent to model (y). Let us call this model (y3). Then the model is proper, it is bisimilar to a two-state model that is like (x) except that the third agent ab can distinguish the ¬p from the p state, let us call that model (x3), and its corresponding simplicial model is (ii) below. Here, agent ab can 'inform' agents a and b of the value of p.
Clearly, any simplicial model for n colours/agents can similarly be enriched with additional colours for all subsets of agents to thus obtain a simplicial model for 2 n − 1 agents wherein all distributed knowledge has become explicit. Note that all epistemic models thus become proper. It is tempting to model this in combinatorial topology with a generalization of simplicial complexes to so-called simplicial sets, as suggested in [41, Section 3.7] . Just as a complex is a set of subsets of a set of vertices, a simplicial set is a multi-set of its subsets, with the same restriction that it is closed under subsets (see e.g. [35] , where a simplicial set is called a pseudocomplex ). In (iii) and (iv) we tentatively depict (i) and (ii) as simplicial sets. 
Novel notions of group knowledge for simplicial complexes
Beyond applying the standard notions of group knowledge for epistemic models on simplicial models, we can also consider novel notions of group knowledge for simplicial models, for example, to express dimensional properties of complexes. Consider the following notion in between common knowledge and distributed knowledge. Let B ⊆ P(A). We extend the language with an inductive construct CB B ϕ, for "it is common distributed knowledge that ϕ (with respect to B)." Given epistemic model
t Such a semantics has been proposed in [67] . But such 'common distributed knowledge' modalities can be equally well interpreted on simplicial models:
Let C = (C, χ, ) be a simplicial model. Define operation * B for all B ⊆ P(A) inductively as: for all X, Y, Z ∈ F(C), X ∈ * B (X), and if Y ∈ * B (X) and there is B ∈ B with B ⊆ χ(Z ∩ Y ), then Z ∈ * B (X). Then:
Here, B can be any set of subsets of A. Of interest in combinatorial topology may be subsets of agents of the same dimension, i.e., all subsets of colours/agents of size m < n. Let us therefore define * m as a special case of the above * B namely such that: X ∈ * m (X), and if Y ∈ * m (X) and there is B ⊆ A with |B| = m + 1 and B ⊆ χ(Z ∩ Y ), then Z ∈ * m (X). 4 We then get:
Clearly, we have that CD 0 ϕ ↔ C A ϕ. An interesting case to reason about simplicial models of dimension n is CD n−1 ϕ. This describes truth in a manifold (see Section 3.2): if C, X |= CD n−1 ϕ and C is a manifold, then ϕ should be true on the entire complex. Otherwise, it is true on a certain subcomplex of C, namely on the restriction of C = (C, χ, ) to the set of vertices v ∈ V(C) containing X that is a manifold. Clearly, for every m < n, CD m ϕ describes truth on a similar subcomplex of C but where all facets intersect in dimension m.
The modalities CD m ϕ are a mere example. We can also consider modalities describing truth on the boundary of a manifold. We can consider variations of so-called conditional common knowledge [59] targetting features of simplicial complexes. And so on.
Example 26 Reconsider the simplicial model of Example 15, below on the left, call it C, and consider as well a variant C extending it, below on the right. We note that C is a manifold, whereas C is not. However, it is tempting to see C as two manifolds intersecting in the vertex named b0. Simplicial model C represents agent b being uncertain between two complexes with only difference the value of c, p c or ¬p c . With the operator CD 1 we can describe truth in the different regions of C . We recall that CD 0 = C A . Some typical truths in C and C are:
• C, X |= C abc p c : this is true as p c is true in facets X, Y, Z.
• C , X |= C abc p c : this is false as, for example, C , V |= p c , and facets X and V are connected via c ∈ χ(X ∩ Z) and b ∈ χ(Z ∩ V ).
• C , X |= CD 1 p c : this is true, as we only need to consider connectivity by a sequence of facets intersecting in dimension 1. We note that |X ∩ Y | = 1 and |Y ∩ Z| = 1, and that p c is true in X, Y and Z. Therefore C, X |= CD 1 p c .
• C , V |= CD 1 ¬p c : in the other part of C , CD 1 describes truth in facets V, U, W . Apart from knowledge, another common notion in epistemic logics is that of belief. The received convention is that, unlike knowledge, beliefs may be false, but that otherwise belief has the properties of knowledge, including the property known as consistency. The modality for belief is B a . That beliefs may be false is embodied in the failure of the validity B a ϕ → ϕ. Instead, we have the 'consistency' axiom B a ϕ →B a ϕ (that corresponds to seriality of underlying frames). Like knowledge, belief should also satisfy the 'introspection' principles B a ϕ → B a B a ϕ and ¬B a ϕ → B a ¬B a ϕ.
More precisely, in the inductive language definition we can replace the inductive clause K a ϕ, for 'agent a knows ϕ', with the inductive clause B a ϕ, for 'agent a believes ϕ' (if we were to have both, a more complex proposal is required).
The validity K a ϕ → ϕ for knowledge characterizes the reflexivity of the epistemic models. With the weaker B a ϕ →B a ϕ for belief the relations in epistemic models are no longer equivalence relations. A typical model wherein agent a incorrectly believes p is M = (S, R, L) with S = {s, t}, R = {(s, t), (t, t)} and p ∈ L(t), often depicted as p a → p (this visualization uses the convention for belief that if an arrow points to a state, that state implicitly has a reflexive arrow). However, this visualization is not relevant for modelling belief on simplicial models.
See [36, 44, 62] for more information on belief.
Semantics of belief
We now address the semantics of belief on simplicial models. Let a simplicial model C = (C, χ, ) be given. For each agent a ∈ A, let f a be an idempotent function between the a-coloured vertices of C, called belief function (a function f is idempotent iff for all x, f (f (x)) = f (x)). We emphasize that f a need not preserve variables: it may well be that p a ∈ (v) but p a / ∈ (f a (v)), or vice versa. We recall the semantics of knowledge on simplicial models:
Somewhat differently but equivalently formulated this is (we recall that X a is the vertex of facet X coloured a):
The proposed semantics of belief is now as follows. It is surprisingly straightforward. Proof These properties are easily derived. The requirement that for all a ∈ A the belief function f a is idempotent guarantees both introspection properties of belief.
• Belief is consistent, because f a is a (total) function and the simplicial complex is pure, so that for any a-coloured vertex v, f a (v) must be contained in at least one facet.
• To show positive introspection we use the contrapositiveB aBa ¬ϕ →B a ¬ϕ. Let C, X |=B aBa ¬ϕ, then there is a facet X such that f a (X a ) ∈ X and C, X |=B a ¬ϕ. Therefore, there are X , X such that: f a (X a ) ∈ X , f a (X a ) ∈ X , and C, X |= ¬ϕ.
As f a is idempotent and as X obviously only contains a single vertex of colour a, f a (X a ) = f a (f a (X a )) = f a (X a ). Therefore, by the semantics of belief, C, X |=B a ¬ϕ.
• Negative introspection is shown very similarly. Let C, X |=B a ϕ be given, i.e., there is a facet X such that f a (X a ) ∈ X and C, X |= ϕ. We need to show that C, X |= B aBa ϕ. In order to show that, let X be such that f a (X a ) ∈ X . Again, as f a (f a (X a )) = f a (X a ) we see that C, X |=B a ϕ, thus C, X |= B aBa ϕ.
A special case of belief is when agents correctly believe (and thus know) the value of their local state but may only be incorrect about the beliefs or the variables of other agents. This is guaranteed by requiring that for all p a ∈ P a , and all vertices v, p a ∈ (v) iff p a ∈ (f a (v)). We call such belief functions locally correct. 
We give three examples of idempotent simplicial functions, and the resulting consequences for the beliefs of the agents:
Agent a mistakenly believes that its local state is p a , whereas in fact it is ¬p a . For the verification of the belief component we note that C, F 1 |= B a p a iff C, F |= p a for all F containing f a (a0) = a1, which are F 2 , F 3 , F 4 that all obviously satisfy a1.
The first conjunct is obvious, the second is because a1 ∈ F 4 , the last is because a1 ∈ F 2 and also because a1 ∈ F 3 , neither satisfy p b ∧ p c .
2.
Similarly to the first item, we now have for example that C,
In F 1 , the beliefs of the agents are inconsistent, they all think to know what the actual state of affairs (the designated facet) is, but their beliefs are incompatible. In fact, for any facet, under this f map, their beliefs about the valuation are mistaken. Also, in any facet, all three agents believe that they are certain (all agents only consider one facet possible).
In this example no belief function is locally correct. If we we were to change the value of p a in vertex a1 into false, then f a and f a would be locally correct.
Simplicial action models
Action model logic is an extension of epistemic logic with operators modelling change of information [6, 64] . Although we can, of course, strictly separate syntax and semantics, it is common to see these operators as epistemic models wherein the valuations of atoms have been replaced by formulas (in the logical language), that should be seen as executability preconditions for the states in the epistemic model, that are therefore not called states but actions. Instead of presenting action models (for which we refer to the above references) we will present their simplicial equivalents, the simplicial action models introduced in [26] . We present them with a minor variation, namely with preconditions for vertices instead of facets, and also including so-called factual change. We recall that we assume that all simplicial complexes are chromatic pure simplicial complexes. This is also the case for simplicial action models.
Simplicial action model A simplicial action model C is a quadruple (C, χ, pre, post) where C is a simplicial complex, χ a chromatic map, pre : V(C) → L K (A, P ) a precondition function assigning to each vertex v ∈ V(C) a formula, and post : V(C) → P → L K (A, P ) a postcondition function assigning to each vertex and to each local variable for the colour of that vertex a formula. 5 If χ(v) = a, pre(v) = ϕ, and post(v)(p) = ψ this should be seen as agent a in v executing the program "If ϕ then p := ψ." Such assignments are simultaneous for all local variables.
Execution of a simplicial action model Let a simplicial model C = (C, χ, ) and a simplicial action model C = (C , χ , pre , post ) be given. The restricted product of C and C is the simplicial model C ⊗ C = (C , χ , ) where:
• for all (v, v ) in the domain of C and for all p ∈ P , p ∈ ((v, v )) iff p ∈ (v).
In [26] , simplicial action models have preconditions associated to facets. The definitions are interchangeable: in one direction, for any facet X, pre(X) := v∈X pre(v), as above, and in the other direction, for any vertex v, pre(v) := v∈X pre(X). Defining preconditions on vertices has however some modelling advantages.
In the first place we can require, as a special case, all preconditions to be local, i.e., any pre(v) for vertex v of colour a has shape K a ϕ (or, alternatively, any pre(v) is equivalent to K a pre(v) on the simplicial model where the simplicial action model is executed). This would be in accordance with distributed computing methodology, where all actions are sending and receiving actions between agents. It rules out those enacted by the environment feeding new information to the system. Most but not all simplicial action models in [26, 41] are local in this sense. An exception are those for binary consensus [41, Ex. 3.48] . One could even enforce commonly known preconditions, as in [28] .
In the second place we can require, as an even more special case, all preconditions to be in the language restricted to the agent colouring that vertex, i..e, any pre(v) for vertex v of colour a is a formula ϕ ∈ L K ({a}, P a ). As the value of all atoms p a is known by a, and given the properties of K a , this implies that preconditions are local. Again, most simplicial action models in [26, 41] are even local in that more restricted sense (e.g., for the immediate snapshot).
A more significant difference from [26] is that we also incorporate factual change (change of the values of local variables) in our simplicial actions models, just as in dynamic epistemic logic [59, 63] . We may need factual change to describe snapshot algorithms with write actions, or binary consensus, of which we will give an example.
Example 29 Once more we consider the simplicial model C from Example 9, in which we execute the action representing that a and b do not know the value of c. We can think of this as a simplicial action model C consisting of two facets intersecting in the edge {b, a}, with preconditions: pre(a ) = ¬(K a p c ∨ K a ¬p c ), pre(b ) = ¬(K b p c ∨ K b ¬p c ), pre(c 0 ) = ¬p c , pre(c 1 ) = p c . Below we depict that model and its execution. We now have, for example, that after this action b still does not c's value, but knows that c now always knows his value: 7 We have to choose a perspective of a pair of facets in the updated model in order to be able to evaluate any formula. For example, C ⊗ C , (F 4 , F 1 ) |= ¬p c whereas C ⊗ C , (F 4 , F 2 ) |= p c .
Example 30
As an example of factual change, consider the following action wherein agent c publicly resets the value of her local variable to true, thus removing the initial uncertainty for a and b about that value. The latter is depicted in C below.
The simplicial action model C consists of a single facet, also depicted, with vertices a, b, c, as usual reusing colours as names, with pre(a) = pre(b) = pre(c) = and post(c)(p c ) = . We may assume the postconditions for the other variables to be trivial, i.e., post(a)(p a ) = p a and post(c)(p b ) = p b . The action c can be executed in both vertices c0 and c1, where we note that in the resulting simplicial model C ⊗ C the valuation is such that p c ∈ (c0, c) and p c ∈ (c1, c). Therefore, the two-faceted updated simplicial model is bisimilar to the single-faceted one depicted to the right of it.
Note that a public assignment of p c to is different from a public announcement that p c (is true). This would result in the same updated simplicial model restriction, but as a consequence of a restriction to the facet wherein p c is true. Example 31 (Simplicial action model for binary consensus) In binary consensus, agents wish to agree on the value of a binary variable. We may assume that this variable is an atomic proposition, and that each agent has a copy that is its local variable, that they can communicate or manipulate while aiming to obtain consensus. Each agent a thus has a variable 1 a , where ¬1 a is 0 a , in order to reach consensus on 0 or 1. We assume that all combinations of values are possible, but also that any kind of knowledge about the values of other agents is possible, thus abstracting from the part of the consensus algorithm obtaining such knowledge from other agents (e.g., possible knowledge gain modelled as subdivisions). This has the advantage that we can focus on the simplicial action model only.
Let there be two agents a, b with variables 1 a , 1 b . For both agents there are four different actions, corresponding to four vertices. Consider a. If K a (1 a ∧ 1 b ), then she leaves the value unchanged (aiming for consensus on value 1), if K a (0 a ∧ 0 b ), she also leaves the value unchanged (aiming for consensus on value 0). Otherwise, she considers it possible that her value and that of b might be different. We note that ¬K a (1 a ∧ 1 b ) ∧ ¬K a (0 a ∧ 0 b ) implies K a (1 a ∨ 1 b ) ∧ K a (0 a ∨ 0 b ). In that case she non-deterministically resets her value to 0 or to 1. This is an assignment 1 a := or 1 a := ⊥ (i.e., reset to value 0). Agent a can distinguish all these actions, whereas agent b cannot distinguish any of those. The four actions of agent b are analogous, and cannot be distinguished by a.
The simplicial action model is therefore defined as C = (C, χ, pre, post) where V(C) = {u i | i = a, b and u = w, x, y, z} and F(C) = {(u a , v b ) | u, v = w, x, y, z}, and χ(u i ) = i for i = a, b and u = w, x, y, z. Then, for i = a, b:
pre(z i ) = K i (0 a ∧ 0 b ) and post(w i )(1 i ) = post(z i )(1 i ) = 1 i post(x i )(1 i ) = post(y i )(1 i ) = ⊥
The assignment post(z i )(1 i ) = 1 i means that the value of 1 i remains the same: if agent i has a 1, it remains 1, and if she has a 0, it remains 0. As is to be expected, unless a and b have common knowledge that the value is 1 or common knowledge that the value is 0, they cannot obtain such common knowledge by executing this simplicial action C: binary consensus is impossible. Even when they both know that the values agree, for example when K a (1 a ∧ 1 b ) and K b (1 a ∧ 1 b ), they may still consider it possible that the other does not know that, as when K a ¬K b (1 a ∧ 1 b ), in which case a considers it possible that b has reset its value to 0, such that consensus would be lost. Although in fact, because K a (1 a ∧ 1 b ) and K b (1 a ∧ 1 b ), they both kept their 1s: there is consensus. And so on, forever.
Validity and agreement are therefore not guaranteed by this simplicial action model. Validity can be obtained for slight variations, for example when agents do not randomly choose a value in case they consider it possible other agents have other values, as here, but choose the value of the majority. Under that policy, then if all agents know all values and there is a majority, validity is guaranteed.
Generalizing the case from 2 agents to n agents is straightforward. Instead of 2 · 4 = 8 vertices we get 4n vertices: linear growth. Interestingly, the corresponding action model grows exponentially, as each action in the action model has a precondition that is a conjunction of n parts, where each conjunct is one of these 4 options: 4 n actions. The distributed modelling is decidedly more elegant.
Conclusion and further research
We have presented a survey of epistemic tools and techniques that can be used to model knowledge and change of knowledge on simplicial complexes, which are a representation of high-dimensional discrete topological spaces. Many of these notions bring in novel issues in this topological setting. In future research we wish to apply these tools to model typical distributed computing tasks and algorithms, beyond the situations studied in [25, 41, 26] , and to explore further epistemic horizons for these and other applications.
An interesting possibility of interaction emerges with algebraic topology, a very deep and mature area of mathematics. For example, the well-known notion of consensus depends on the connectivity of an epistemic frame and the related notion of common knowledge [27] ; this is a 1-dimensional topological property. However, other notions of knowledge appear to be related to higher-dimensional topological properties, and to forms of agreement weaker than consensus [24] .
With the exception of Example 5 modelling synchronous computation, we did not investigate impure complexes. Such complexes may well be interpreted in terms of unawareness of local variables as in [19] (and as unawareness of agents). Special notions of bisimulation would fit impure complexes.
As suggested in [41] , distributed knowledge may be employed to describe simplicial sets, the generalization of simplicial complexes to multi-sets (the pseudocomplexes of [35] , with a similar duality to graphs [11] ). Then, we could have two facets that are indistinguishable to all agents, aiming at removing the requirement that the epistemic model be proper.
It would also be interesting to consider infinite models. In distributed computing, infinitely many states and infinitely many agents (processes) have been considered in e.g. [2] . In modal logic, many tools and techniques apply just as well to the countably infinite situation.
